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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of firms’ financial factors on discount rate
choices for pension accounting. Pension obligations are calculated based on
firms’ future prospects; therefore, firms have to use assumptions to estimate
obligations. Several prior papers show that managers change their actuarial
assumptions to reduce their pension obligations and manage their earnings.
Japanese accounting standard for employee benefits had required firms until
2008 to determine their discount rates with consideration of an average
discount rate of past five-year market yields, whereas IFRS and US-GAAP
require firms to review their discount rates annually. In this paper, five factors
were included in order — profitability, leverage, pension funding status, cash
flows from operating activities, and tax-paying status — to determine whether
Japanese firms also use discount rates for earnings management. The results
suggest that profitability, leverage, pension funding status, and cash flows
from operating activities can be factors for firm managers to determine or
change firms’ discount rates. Therefore, firms’ other financial factors affect the
setting of discount rates. The conclusion is that Japanese firms also manage
earnings through pension accounting.
Keywords: actuarial assumptions, discount rate, earnings management
1. Introduction
International Accounting Standard No.37: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and
Contingent Assets (IAS37) states that a provision should be recognized when an entity has a
present obligation as a result of a past event, it is probable that an outflow of resources
embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, and a reliable estimate
can be made of the amount of the obligation (IAS37, par.IN2).  Pension is defined as future
payment of employees’ salary. The future payment has to be discounted and recognized as
“present obligations”. Firms use some actuarial assumptions to estimate the present
obligations. The accounting method makes pension accounting difficult to understand for
financial statement users.
Changes in actuarial assumptions have a significant effect on the calculation of pension
obligations. However, only a few actuarial assumptions are disclosed in footnotes. Several
* Ph.D Student, Graduate School of Business Administration, Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan
66 Eriko KASAOKA
papers show that managers change their actuarial assumptions to reduce their pension
obligations and manage their earnings. In Japan, discount rates were determined with
consideration of an average discount rate of past five-year market yields until 2008, whereas
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) require firms to review their discount rates annually. Under this condition,
it seems to be more difficult for Japanese firms to use actuarial assumptions to control
pension obligation amounts and manipulate their earnings than firms that adopt IFRS or
SFAS.
Therefore, this paper examines whether other financial factors affect the change or level of
discount rates, and firms use actuarial assumptions for their earnings management.
2. Categories of Actuarial Assumptions
There are some assumptions made, including discount rate, expected rate of return on plan
assets, and future salary and benefit levels, to determine the entity’s pension cost.
International Accounting Standard No.19: Employee Benefits (IAS19) states that these
assumptions must be unbiased and mutually compatible (IAS19, par.72). IAS19 classifies
them according to their characteristics as follows (IAS19, par.73):
(a) Demographic assumptions
(i) mortality, both during and after employment
(ii) rates of employee turnover, disability and early retirement
(iii) the proportion of plan members with dependants who will be eligible for benefits
(iv) claim rates under medical plans
(b) Financial assumptions
(i) the discount rate
(ii) future salary and benefit levels
(iii) in the case of medical benefits, future medical costs, including, where material, the
cost of administering claims and benefit payments
(iv) the expected rate of return on plan assets
In pension financing, actuarial assumptions including mortality, rates of employee
turnover, the discount rate, future salary increase, and the expected rate of return on plan
assets are mainly used to estimate pension obligations1. There are some differences in these
assumptions between the Japanese accounting standard on employee benefits and other
international accounting standards. Therefore, the details of these five assumptions are
discussed below.
1 Kobayashi, Nobuyuki and Fujiwara, Satoru, Accounting Practice on Employee Benefits, Tokyo: Toyo
Keizai, Inc., Japan, 1999, p.81.
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2.1 Mortality
A mortality rate is a death rate at each age during employees’ tenure of office and after
their retirement. It is calculated based on the population mortality table of each country a firm
operates. Mortality rates in each country are different, but it is not well-known that this has a
significant effect on the amount of pension liability within pension funding valuations. Only a
quarter of the firms provide mortality assumptions in their financial statements2.
Verrall, Sithole, and Habeman (2005) examine current practice on mortality assumptions
in the EU. Their paper consists of two analyses, in-country analysis and cross-country
analysis. In in-country analysis, they focus on the probability of death; the expected future
lifetime for an individual aged x years; probabilities of survival conditional on reaching ages
50, 60, 65 and 70; and the expected present value of annuities at a reference rate of interest.
Regarding cross-country analysis, they show observed and assumed future life expectancy for
a male or female aged 65, the ratio of typically assumed probability of death for a male or
female member aged 65, the annuity value for a male or female aged 65, and so on. They
compare these data in each country, and conclude that current practice varies considerably
across the EU, and the mortality assumption can have a significant effect on the liabilities in
firm balance sheets. Collins (2001) also examines how firms across the EU use different
actuarial methods and assumptions. He mentions how some countries, such as Denmark and
Portugal, use a single mortality rate at each age while most countries including Ireland,
United Kingdom, and Luxembourg apply different mortality rates to actives, pensioners, and
2 Ernst&Young, IFRS -Observations on the Implementation of IFRS-, September 2006, p.68.
Figure 2.1  Average Lifetime in Japan




There are three pension funds in Japan based on defined benefit plans, employees’ pension
fund, defined benefit corporate pension, and tax-qualified pension plan. Tax-qualified pension
plans will be abolished in March 2012. Therefore, employees’ pension fund and defined
benefit corporate pension will be discussed below. Firms that have employees’ pension fund
rely partly on the mortality rates indicated in a notification provided by the Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare. Firms having defined benefit corporate pension use the mortality
rates regulated by the enforcement ordinance of defined benefit corporate pension3.  They
both provide that assumptions including mortality rate shall be the same rate as the one used
in the last funding valuations when there is no significant effect on pension funding
valuations. However, when the rate is revised, the change has to be reflected in the valuations.
3 Pension Fund Association, “Glossary,” http://www.pfa.or.jp/yogoshu/yo/yo06.html.
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, “Abridged Life Table in 2008,”
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/life/life08/dl/gaikyou01.pdf, p.2.
Table 2.1  The Expected Future Lifetime at Age x in Years
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In general, when people live longer, the mortality rate becomes lower, and as a result, the
estimated amount of pension obligation increases. With the improvement of medical care
quality and hygiene, mortality rates all over the world are getting lower. As shown in Figure
2.1, average lifetime is increasing every year in Japan. Table 2.1 also indicates that the
expected future lifetime at age x in 2008 was longer than in 2007. It can be predicted that the
mortality rate used in pension funding valuations must be getting lower.
Because of the increase in the average lifetime, the Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare revised the mortality rate tables for employees’ pension fund in 2009. In Table 2.2,
most of the rates under age 90 in the current tables are lower than the previous one, except in
the case of female post-employees, bereaved family, and disabilities. Because of the longer
average lifetime for females, all rates for women are lower than those for males.
Table 2.3 shows comparisons of the average lifetime in each country. Japan has the second
Table 2.2  Tables of Mortality Rates on Employees’ Pension Fund
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Amendments of Financial Administration Policy on
Employees’ Pension Fund, Tokyo: MHLW, September 30th, 2009.
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Table 2.3  Average Lifetime in Each Country
Note : The population is a mid-year estimate. For Japan, it is estimated as of October 1st, 2008.
Source : Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, “Abridged Life Table in 2008,”
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/life/life08/dl/gaikyou01.pdf, p.4.
Year Population
                                  
Country Calculated Male Female (millions)
Japan 2008 79.3 86.1 126.0
AFRICA Algeria 2000 72.5 74.2 33.5
Egypt 2006 69.2 73.6 72.0
Nigeria 2000-2005 52.0 52.2 140.0
South Africa 2004 49.9 52.9 47.4
Tunisia 2007 72.3 76.2 10.1
NORTH AMERICA Canada 2005 78.0 82.7 32.7
Mexico 2008 72.7 77.5 104.9
United States 2006 75.1 80.2 299.4
SOUTH AMERICA Argentina 2000-2001 70.0 77.5 39.0
Brazil 2007 68.8 76.4 186.8
Chile 2005 75.5 81.5 16.4
Peru 1995-2000 65.9 70.9 27.4
ASIA China 2000 69.6 73.3 1311.0
India 2001-2005 62.3 63.9 1117.7
Indonesia 2002 64.2 68.1 222.1
Israel 2007 78.8 82.5 7.1
Korea, Republic of 2007 76.1 82.7 48.3
Malaysia 2007 71.7 76.5 26.6
Singapore 2007 78.2 82.9 4.5
Thailand 2002 69.9 74.9 65.3
EUROPE Austria 2008 77.6 83.0 8.3
Belgium 2004 76.5 82.4 10.5
Czech Republic 2008 74.0 80.1 10.3
Denmark 2007-2008 76.3 80.7 5.4
Finland 2008 76.3 83.0 5.3
France 2008 77.5 84.3 61.4
Germany 2005-2007 76.9 82.3 82.4
Iceland 2008 79.6 83.0 0.3
Italy 2006 78.4 84.0 58.9
Netherlands 2008 78.4 82.4 16.4
Norway 2008 78.3 83.0 4.7
Poland 2008 71.3 80.0 38.1
Russian Federation 2006 60.4 73.2 142.5
Spain 2005 77.0 83.5 44.1
Sweden 2008 79.1 83.2 9.1
Switzerland 2007 79.4 84.2 7.5
United Kingdom 2005-2007 77.2 81.5 60.6
OCEANIA Australia 2005-2007 79.0 83.7 20.7
New Zealand 2005-2007 78.0 82.2 4.2
(Unit : Years)
71
Determinants of Changes and Levels in Discount Rates
for Defined-Benefit Pension Plans
highest lifetime for men and the highest for women. This means that the mortality used in
pension funding valuations for Japan must be lower than other countries. This will not be a
big problem if investors compare firms within Japan. However, the method of setting the rate
and the rate itself must be different in each country, and the rate has a significant effect on
pension funding valuations. Therefore, the rate should be required to be disclosed on financial
statements.
2.2 Rates of Employee Turnover
The rate of employee turnover is an estimated rate of the number of employees who retire
at each age in relation to the average number of employees. Generally speaking, it is
calculated based on the past record, excluding abnormal values on mass layoffs or retirement
in each firm. The rate varies for industry segments and individual firms. In general, the ratio
is high around 20’s, it becomes stable after 30 years of age, and it gets very high around
retirement age. When the rate of employee turnover is high, the estimated amount of pension
obligations becomes smaller4.
The formula to calculate pension obligations is as follows. The first three factors calculate
the estimated total amount of employee benefits at the retirement. A rate of employee
turnover is a factor to indicate the probability that employees receive their employee
benefits5.
From a different point of view, Ippolito (1997) studies the relation between pensions and
quit rates. The study proves that wage increase and pensions are important factors for
employees to decide to stay at their firms. Therefore, if firms provide good salaries and
pensions to employees, it affects three factors in the formula above — employee’s current
salary, future salary increase, and rate of employee turnover — and as a result, increases
pension obligations.
2.3 Discount Rate
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) required an entity to use the
4 Chuo Audit Corp. & NLI Research Institute, Accounting and Tax Practice on Corporate Pension,
Tokyo: Nikkei Inc., 1999, p.62.
5 Emura, Hiroshi, and Inoue, Masahiko, The New Retirement Benefit Scheme and the Practical
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discount rate determined by reference to market yields on high quality corporate bonds at the
end of the reporting period, and if there is no deep market for these bonds, the entity had to
use the market yields on government bonds (IAS19, par.78). As a result of the recent global
financial crisis, the difference between yields on corporate bonds and yields on government
bonds has a significant effect on the amount of pension obligations. Therefore, IASB has
decided not to use the market yields on government bonds. If there is no deep market for such
bonds, it requires an entity to apply the principles and approach in International Accounting
Standard No.39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. IASB believes that
this accounting change will improve comparability in financial statements across entities and
through time for the same entity (Exposure Draft, pars.78, BC4).
Japanese accounting standard provides that an entity shall determine the discount rate
based on yields on safe and secure long bonds. The safe and secure long bonds include
government bonds, government agency securities, and high-grade corporate bonds
(Accounting Standard for Employee Benefits, Appendix 6). High-grade corporate bonds
means bonds with better than AA grades assigned by several credit-rating agencies—
Standard & Poor’s, Rating and Investment Information Inc., or Japan Credit Rating Agency,
Ltd. (Practical Guidelines on Accounting Standard for Employee Benefits (Progress Report),
11). Basically, yields of these corporate bonds are set higher than government bonds because
of their lower credit capability.
The discount rate was determined with consideration of an average discount rate of past
five-year market yields in each firm. With the ongoing convergence project with IASB,
Japanese accounting standard eliminated the requirement to use the average rate of past five-
year market yields, because there is no adequate reason that can explain why this discount
rate is more reliable than the one calculated by a market yield at the balance sheet date
(Amendments to Accounting Standard for Employee Benefits No.3, Appendix 11). Therefore,
now Japanese accounting standard requires firms to review the discount rate annually.
Figure 2.2 compares average discount rates with government bond rates from 2001 to
2009.  The data were collected from Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2009),
which is provided by the Nikkei Digital Media, Inc.. Firms were selected which set both
discount rates and expected return rates for accounting standard on employee benefits,
because it is possible that firms do not have pension plans if they do not set these rates6.
For the first three years, there is a significant difference between average discount rates
and yields on government bonds. The current Japanese accounting standard on employee
benefits was introduced in 2001. Firms were not required to recognize pension obligations
6 Suda, Kazuyuki, Empirical Analysis of Accounting Reform, Tokyo: Dobunkan Shuppan, Co. Ltd., 2004,
p.58.
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Figure 2.2  Average Discount Rates and Yields of Government Bonds
Sources : Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2009)
Ministry of Finance Japan, “Auction Announcement and Result,” http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/
kokusai/1c010.html.
and plan assets on their financial statements before the accounting change. Therefore, they
might have some difficulties in estimating the best discount rates for them according to the
new accounting standard. From 2004 to 2009, the movement of average discount rates was
similar to the movement on yields of 20 and 30-year government bonds. Firms tend to choose
their discount rates between 20-year government bonds and 30-year government bonds.
Table 2.4 shows the range of discount rates firms adopt. The chart indicates that firms
tended to adopt rates around 3.0 to 3.99% in 2001 and 2002, and 2.0 to 2.99% from 2003 to
2009. Firms adopting SFAS, such as Toyota, Honda, Sony, or Nissan, tended to set higher
discount rates. For 2009, the standard deviation was higher than those from 2001 to 2008
because, while most firms chose discount rates between 1.0 and 2.99%, there were 48 firms
that assumed rates over 6.0%. The discount rates firms adopted varied more widely than those
from 2001 to 2008.
Table 2.5 reports the frequency and level of changes in the discount rate. For the first three
years, the frequency of changes on discount rates is high. After 2004, over 80% of firms





2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Discount Rate 3.26 2.87 2.55 2.38 2.31 2.28 2.29 2.29 2.34
10-year Government Bond 1.29 1.28 0.99 1.50 1.36 1.75 1.70 1.52 1.36
20-year Government Bond 2.00 1.96 1.53 2.10 2.02 2.16 2.15 2.19 2.05
30-year Government Bond 2.34 2.07 1.60 2.41 2.42 2.50 2.50 2.41 2.14
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20 and 30-year government bonds became stable after 2004. As mentioned above, a prior
Japanese accounting standard prescribed that the discount rate was to be determined with
consideration of an average discount rate of past five-year market yields in each firm.
However, Table 2.5 shows that over 35% of firms changed their discount rates from 2001 to
Table 2.4  Range of Discount Rates Firms Adopt
Source : Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2009)
Table 2.5  Frequency and Level of Changes in Discount Rates
Source : Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2009)
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2004. Over 90% of firms had no change on discount rates, even though there was a big
economic slump starting from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2007. Thus it was
difficult for firms to set appropriate discount rates owing to the introduction of the new
accounting standard from 2001 to 2004.
2.4 Future Salary Increase
Future salary increase is based on employee wage administration in each firm, average
salary, salary raise in the past, and so on7. It consists of two categories: mandatory pay raise
and an across-the-board pay increase. Mandatory pay raise is affected by age-related
procession on employees’ salaries. According to Japanese accounting standard, mandatory
pay raises should be calculated based on age-specific average salaries according to the
statistical data on current employees. An across-the-board pay increase determines movement
of future salary levels. The rate is included in the future salary increase only when it is
expected to grow for certain (Practices on Accounting for Employee Benefits, Appendix I, 2).
On the other hand, IASB states that estimates of future salary increases take account of
inflation, seniority, promotion, and other relevant factors (IAS19, par.84). An across-the-
7 Yamaguchi, Osamu, Practice of Pension Obligations, Tokyo: Chuokeizai-sha, Inc., 2000, p.130.
Table 2.6  Rates of Future Salary Increase
Note : Kubota and Kyocera corporations use a point system.
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board pay increase is included in the calculation of pension obligations. The definition of
future salary increase IASB states is wider than that in Japanese accounting standard.
Japanese accounting standard doesn’t require firms to disclose the rates of future salary
increases. However, SFAS require the disclosure of the rate on financial statements. There are
18 Japanese firms listed on New York Stock Exchange. The rates of future salary increases for
these firms are shown in Table 2.6.
The level of the rate each firm chooses depends on the firm’s management condition,
salary increase scheme, and economic situation it is in. Most of firms in Table 2.6 chose rates
from 2.0 to 4.0%. Firms tend not to change their rates significantly every year. As mentioned
above, there was the bankruptcy of a big investment bank in 2007, and worldwide recession
spread after that. However, most firms still keep their rates level, and some firms even assume
higher rates. This rate might be easier to predict than other assumptions, such as a discount
rate or an expected rate of return, since there are fewer uncertainties.
2.5 Expected Rate of Return on Plan Assets
The expected rate of return on plan assets (ERR) is based on market expectations, at the
beginning of the period, for returns over the entire life of the related obligation (IAS19,
par.106). Japanese accounting standard states that ERR is assumed with consideration of
investment portfolio, management performance in the past, management policy, and the
market for plan assets that firms hold (Practical Guidelines on Accounting Standard for
Employee Benefits (Progress Report), 12). Imafuku (2000) states the reasons why ERR is set
based on different information from that of the discount rate8:
- ERR is an expected rate rather than a realized rate. The amount of pension obligation
calculated by the expected rate isn’t based on present value.
- It shall impair comparability if the amount of pension obligations is influenced by
management of plan assets.
- Risks and uncertainty on future cash flows of pension obligations are not related to
expected yield rates of plan assets.
In accounting standards, the definition of pension obligations is different from that of plan
assets. Therefore, the method of setting ERR should be different from the one for the discount
rate.
There are many papers examining the relationship between earnings manipulation and
ERR. Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) find firms use higher assumed ERR when they
prepare to acquire other firms, when they are near critical earnings thresholds, and when their
managers exercise stock options. Managers can use pension accounting to boost reported
8 Imafuku, Aishi, Accounting for Retirement Benefits, Tokyo: Shinsei-sha Co. Ltd., Japan, 2000, pp.71-73.
77
Determinants of Changes and Levels in Discount Rates
for Defined-Benefit Pension Plans
profits on financial statements, and as a result, to influence stock prices. Li and Klumpes
(2007) suggest that highly leveraged firms and underfunded firms systematically report
higher ERRs. They also show that sample firms with higher leverage have a greater
propensity to increase reported ERRs9. These results support the premise that UK managers
inflate reported ERRs when they face a higher probability of technical default. Yoshida
(2009) finds that unprofitable firms tend to choose higher ERRs. In a limited way, if firms can
achieve their return on assets (ROA) in the previous fiscal year, they increase their ERRs.
In light of this situation, additional information on ERR might be useful to investors.
There are some firms that disclose the ERR on plan assets, such as equities, bonds, property,
etc. The IASB couldn’t mandate this information to be on financial statements, because there
was resistance from those who commented on the exposure draft10. Also, Amir and Benartzi
(1998) suggest considering enforcement of disclosure requirements regarding pension asset
composition, because their study shows pension asset composition information is positively
9 However, they suggest that there is no evidence on the ERR being used to smooth earnings under
Financial Reporting Standard No.17: Employee Benefits.
10 Ernst&Young, Ibid., pp.68-69.
Figure 2.3  Average Expected Rates of Return and Actual Rates of Return
Sources : Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2009)
Pension Fund Association, “The Movement of Adjusted Earning Yields on Pension Assets,”
http://www.pfa.or.jp/jigyo/tokei/shisanunyo/shisanunyo01.html.
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correlated with the future actual return on plan assets11. Such accounting standards might
improve the comparability among firms in different countries.
Figure 2.3 presents average expected rates and actual rates of return on employees’
pension fund and defined benefit corporate pension. It is apparent from the graph that average
expected rate in each year is always different from the actual rate of return.
Table 2.7 reports the range of ERRs firms adopt. Most of firms choose ERRs from 1.0 to
4.99%. The standard deviation in each year is higher than that for discount rates. It means that
the range of ERRs firms select is wider than that for discount rates.
Table 2.8 and 2.9 explain the movement of actual rates of return in Figure 2.3. Employees’
pension fund and defined benefit corporate pension invest 40% to 50% of their assets in
domestic and foreign stocks.
In 2002, the Nikkei Stock Average tumbled to a new low after the Japanese economic
Table 2.7  Range of Expected Rates of Return Firms Adopt
Source : Nikkei Economic Electonic Databank System (2009)
11 Their study also indicates that the ERR is not significantly associated with the future actual return on
plan assets.
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bubble burst. The recession in the U.S. and the bankruptcy of WorldCom made foreign stock
prices decline further. In 2003, worldwide monetary policy relaxation increased domestic and
foreign stock prices. In 2004, the decrease of GDP in Japan, the increase in crude oil prices,
and monetary tightening in China decreased domestic stock prices. In 2006, there was a
worldwide decline in stock values, stock prices in China declined, and the financial crisis in
the U.S. was triggered by defaults on sub-prime mortgage loans. In 2007, sub-prime mortgage
loans grew into a serious problem, and they affected all domestic and foreign bond and stock
prices. In 2008, the bankruptcy of the big investment bank, Lehman Brothers led to a global
economic slowdown12.
12 Pension Fund Association, “The Survey and Comment on Pension Asset Management,” http://
www.pfa.or.jp/jigyo/tokei/shisanunyo/jittai/index.html.
Table 2.9  Pension Asset Structure
Source : Pension Fund Association, “The Survey and Comment on Pension Asset Management,”
http://www.pfa.or.jp/jigyo/toukei/shisanunyo/jittai/index.html.
Table 2.8  Rates of Return Categorized by Assets
Source : Pension Fund Association, “The Survey and Comment on Pension Asset
Management,” http://www.pfa.or.jp/jigyo/toukei/shisanunyo/jitt ai/index.ht ml.
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Table 2.10 reports how often and how much firms change their ERRs. Comparing the data
to that in Table 2.5, firms change their ERRs more than their discount rates, except in 2001
and 2002. Similar to the tendency of changes in discount rates, many firms changed their
ERRs from 2001 to 2003, and had no change in ERRs after 2004.
Many factors affect the determination of ERRs. These factors include much uncertainty
concerning economic movement all over the world. The average ERRs are stable, however,
average actual rates of return moves up and down every year. It means that volatility on ERRs
is quite high.
3. Prior Research
These results above indicate how different actuarial assumptions selected by each firm are.
All actuarial assumptions are not disclosed on financial statements. Okumura (2005) states
that if a firm’s discount rate is increased 1% from 3% to 4% under certain conditions —
employees’ average age is 40 year-old, retirement age is 60 year-old, and period of benefit is
for 15 years — the Predicted Benefit Obligations (PBO) will drop by 23%. Therefore, these
rates have a significant effect on the calculation of pension obligations and pension cost.
Several studies show there is a possibility that managers in firms control these assumptions to
make their financial statements look better.
Morris, Nichols, and Niehaus (1983) discuss why firms change actuarial assumptions.
They indicate that firms change their assumptions due to a decrease of pension expense and
an increase in the reported income figure, an advantage in tax status of pension contributions
and plan earnings, and a decrease of pension obligation. They conclude that corporate
managers consider the extent of a plan’s overfunding or underfunding when they decide how
much they change their actuarial assumptions. Bodie, Light, Morck and Taggart (1987) find a
pension fund liability on financial statements is systematically linked to firms’ profitability
Source : Nikkei Economic Electrionic Databank System (2009)
Table 2.10  Frequency and Level of Change in Expected Rates of Return
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through the choice of a discount rate. More profitable firms tend to choose lower discount
rates, which leads to a greater amount of pension liabilities. They also find a relationship
between the level of pension funding and firms’ long-run profitability. Ghicas (1990) shows
when firms have lower working capital, higher debt, and a lower rate of undertaking new
investments, they switch their actuarial cost methods, and reduce their pension funding.
Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1995) find that leverage and pension plan funding status are
related to the choice of actuarial assumptions, the discount rate, and the rate of future salary
increase. In their study, firms with higher leverage and pension plan funding choose higher
discount rates and lower rates of future salary increases. They suggest that firms might set
these rates in a manner that is favorable to them.
Godwin, Goldberg and Duchac (1996) examine whether six factors — changes in cash
flows, earnings per share, tax status, leverage, dividends, and the market interest rate — affect
the choice of actuarial assumptions or not. Their study provides evidence that managers are
likely to increase actuarial assumptions in response to tighter dividend restrictions, lower
earnings, higher leverage, and reductions in the tax benefits of plan funding. Asthana (1996)
examines the effects of firms’ financial and pension profiles on their funding strategies and
actuarial choices, using factors similar to those of Godwin, Goldberg and Duchac (1996). This
paper’s results indicate that when firms have greater profitability, greater cash flows from
operating activities, lower tax liability, and smaller debt, they tend to choose conservative
actuarial choices to maximize contributions. Conversely, when firms have smaller
profitability, smaller cash flows from operating activities, higher tax liability, and larger the
debt, they tend to select liberal actuarial choices to minimize contributions. Funding status
also affects firms’ actuarial choices. Firms overfunded make conservative actuarial choices,
and those underfunded make liberal actuarial choices to avoid pension costs. Obinata (2000)
examines what factors affect firms’ choices on discount rates, and reports that profitability has
an impact on firms’ choices. This paper also studies if stock prices reflect the size of pension
discount rate. It indicates that firms choosing lower pension discount rates are valued higher.
Most studies suggest that managers tend to manipulate pension transactions as an earnings
management tool. Firms’ profitability, debt, cash flows from operating activities, pension
funding status, and tax status can be primary factors to determine actuarial assumptions.
However, only Blankley and Swanson (1995) examine whether firms manipulate actuarial
assumptions consistent with the requirements of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
No.87: Employers’ Accounting for Pensions (SFAS87) as a tool of earnings management.
They conclude that there is no evidence of systematic manipulation of actuarial assumptions
in order to manage earnings or pension funding.
A revised Japanese accounting standard on employee benefits was introduced in 2001.
Prior Japanese accounting rules required disclosing only the content of the pension plan and
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the transition method when firms change their pension plans. It didn’t require firms to
recognize pension obligations, plan assets, and pension costs on financial statements. When
the current accounting standard was introduced, most firms had to recognize significant
amounts of pension liabilities on their financial statements. Table 2.5 and 2.10 show that from
2001 to 2004, many firms decreased their discount rates and ERRs, which increased their
pension obligation and pension cost amounts, and after 2005, firms tended not to change these
assumptions. From 2001 to 2004, firms might have sought proper discount rates for their best
estimation of pension obligations and pension costs. After 2005, which is five years after the
introduction of the current accounting standard, firms might have been able to decide their
actuarial assumptions with consideration of an average discount rate of past five-year market
yields. Most of the papers described above prove managers change their actuarial assumptions
in response to reduce pension obligations and pension costs. However, Japanese firms were
required to decide their actuarial assumptions with consideration of an average discount rate
of past five-year market yields. Under this condition, it seems to be difficult for Japanese
firms to use pension accounting to manipulate their earnings. Most Japanese firms disclose
only their discount rates and ERRs in their footnotes. Discount rates have the most significant
effect on the estimated amount of pension liabilities, because pension obligations are higher
than plan assets in most Japanese firms. Therefore, this paper will examine whether other
financial factors affect firms’ decision on their discount rates to see if Japanese firms also use
discount rates for earnings management.
4. Hypothesis Development
Actuarial assumptions are important factors to calculate pension obligations. IASB shows
eight assumptions necessary for pension obligation measurement, and each assumption has a
significant impact on the measurement. Firms might have incentives to manipulate their
earnings by increasing or decreasing these assumptions, because all actuarial assumptions are
not disclosed on their footnotes.
This paper will focus on discount rates and investigate if firms change their discount rates
when other financial factors change, and if these financial factors have any effect on the
choice of discount rates. As explained in Section 2.3, there was an important accounting
change with respect to the discount rate, so that the discount rate is now determined with
consideration of the yields on safe and secure long bonds at the end of the fiscal year. This
research will also try to find whether the discount rate will fluctuate more if it is affected by
other financial factors. Factors that might affect the choice of discount rates include
profitability, leverage, pension funding status, cash flows from operating activities, tax-paying
status, and others. Details of these factors are discussed as follows:
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4.1 Profitability
Several papers prove that managers at firms change their actuarial assumptions for
earnings management. Increases in discount rates decrease pension obligations and pension
costs, and the resulting increase in earnings would yield a better valuation from investors. The
first hypothesis of changes in profitability is as follows:
H 1a: A firm whose profitability (income before taxes/ net assets) increases does not
change the discount rate. Conversely, the firm whose profitability decreases changes the
discount rate.
Asthana (1999), Ghicas (1990),  Godwin, Goldberg and Duchac (1996), and Obinata
(2000) include profitability in their models to examine the effect of financial ratios on firm’s
changes in actuarial methods, and Asthana (1999), Godwin, Goldberg and Duchac (1996),
and Obinata (2000)13 present profitability as significant in their models.
For discount rate levels, choosing the higher discount rate decreases the amount of pension
obligations and pension costs. Therefore, a firm whose profitability is low might set the
discount rate high. The first hypothesis for the levels of discount rates is as follows:
H 1b: The higher the firm’s profitability, the lower the firm’s discount rate. Conversely, the
lower the firm’s profitability, the higher the firm’s discount rate.
4.2 Leverage
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.158: Employers’ Accounting for Defined
Benefit Pension and Other Post Retirement Plans (SFAS158) requires disclosing unfunded
pension liabilities on the balance sheet. Japanese accounting standard on employee benefits
also requires disclosing them on the balance sheet from 2012. Pension deficits are subtracted
from shareholders’ equity. Therefore, the effect of pension liabilities on firms’ capital
structure is significant. In this paper, debt to equity ratio is employed, which is one of the
most important financial ratios to know firms’ leverage and capital risk. The ratio has an
effect on the cost of capital, which is the rate of return a firm is expected to earn, because the
stakeholders invest at the same risk as the rate of return. It is often used when stakeholders
evaluate, invest, or finance the firm. The cost of capital is an important factor on financing
and business decisions, and debt to equity ratio also can be the important factor. Under the
current Japanese accounting standard, pension liabilities are disclosed in footnotes. They are
amortized over several years and affect future earnings. Pension liabilities can be regarded as
long-term liabilities. When a firm’s leverage becomes higher, there is a possibility that the
firm increases the discount rate to avoid the cost over several years. Therefore, the second
13 In his paper, earnings before income taxes deflated by equity have the most significant effect on the
changes in discount rate.
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hypothesis of changes in leverage is as follows:
H 2a: A firm whose leverage (debt to equity ratio) decreases does not change the discount
rate. Conversely, a firm whose leverage increases changes the discount rate.
For levels of leverage, when a firm’s leverage is higher, it might use a higher discount rate
to eliminate the effect on future earnings. Therefore, the second hypothesis of levels in
leverage is as follows:
H 2b: The higher the firm’s leverage, the higher the firm’s discount rate. Conversely, the
lower the firm’s leverage, the lower the firm’s discount rate.
4.3 Pension Funding Status
When the Japanese accounting standard on employee benefits was introduced, it became
apparent that firms had a considerable amount of pension deficits, and there was a lot of
public attention on their pension funding status. Pension obligations provide the greatest share
of total liabilities. Li and Klumpes (2007) indicate that higher actuarial assumptions directly
contribute to both the existence and magnitude of actuarially determined pension deficits or
surpluses for both financial reporting and funding purposes. Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue
(1995) suggest that there is a negative correlation between the discount rate and the size of the
pension liability, because a large unfunded pension liability could mean a lower credit rating
and higher cost of debt for the firms. The levels and changes of discount rates directly affect
the amount of pension obligations. Therefore, the third hypothesis of changes in pension
funding status is as follows:
H 3a: The firm whose pension funding status decreases does not change the discount rate.
Conversely, a firm whose pension funding status increases changes the discount rate.
Pension funding status is calculated by pension obligations divided by plan assets. Higher
ratios mean higher unfunded status. Firms might use higher discount rates to reduce their
pension liabilities, and make their balance sheets appear better. Therefore, the third hypothesis
of levels in pension funding status is as follows:
H 3b: The higher the firm’s pension funding status, the higher the firm’s discount rate.
Conversely, the lower the firm’s pension funding status, the lower the firm’s discount rate.
4.4 Cash Flows from Operating Activities
Increases in actuarial assumptions reduce the pension cost and the cash contribution to the
pension plans. As a result, cash flows increase for several years after the assumption change.
In general, Japanese firms make payments for their employees’ pension as compensation for
their work after their retirement (Statement of Position on Accounting Standard for Employee
Benefits, 3, 1). Pension is defined as future payment of employees’ salary. Therefore, the
increases of cash flows are included in cash flows from operating activities on statements of
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cash flows. Obinata (2000) uses both operating cash flows and investing cash flows in his
model to see what factors affect firms’ choice of pension discount rates. The result shows that
only operating cash flows are significant.
International Accounting Standard No.7: Statement of Cash Flows (IAS7) states that firms
need cash and cash equivalents to conduct their operations, to pay their obligations, and to
provide returns to their investors (IAS7, par.3). A statement of cash flows enhances the
comparability of the reporting of operating performance by different firms, because it
eliminates the effects of using different accounting treatments for the same transactions and
prices (IAS7, par.4). Therefore, cash and cash equivalents are important factors for users of
financial statements to evaluate firms. Firms might choose higher discount rates to increase
their cash and cash equivalents if cash decreases. The fourth hypothesis of changes in cash
flows from operating activities is as follows:
H 4a: The firm whose cash flows from operating activities increases does not change the
discount rate. Conversely, the firm whose cash flows from operating activities decreases
changes the discount rate.
It can be also said that firms whose cash and cash equivalents are low might use higher
discount rates. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis of levels in cash flows from operating
activities is as follows:
H 4b: The higher the firm’s cash flows from operating activities, the lower the firm’s discount
rate. Conversely, the lower the firm’s cash flows from operating activities, the higher the
firm’s discount rate.
4.5 Tax-Paying Status
Tax deduction is one of the most important reasons firms provide pension plans to their
employees. All pension premiums made can be recognized as expense in that year in Japan.
When firms make additional contributions to make up for the shortage of pension funding, it
is also recognized as expense. Feldstein and Morck (1983) note that the tax law is a strong
reason for firms to assume a low interest rate. Their analysis shows that firms with large
pension liabilities tend to choose high interest rate assumptions, and firms with overfunded
status increase their pension liability amount to enjoy the tax benefits. The assumed interest
rate is related to the firm’s unfunded pension status. In our research, only 1,100 out of 10,444
firms have overfunded pension status. Therefore, it might be difficult to see the effect of tax-
paying status on discount rate changes and levels in this study. The fifth hypothesis of
changes in tax-paying status is as follows:
H 5a: The firm whose tax-paying status decreases does not change the discount rate.
Conversely, the firm whose tax-paying status increases changes the discount rate.
The calculation of effective tax rates Zimmerman (1983) states is employed.
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Effective tax rate = (Income taxes – Changes in deferred taxes) / Cash flows from operating
activities
The fifth hypothesis of levels in tax-paying status is as follows:
H 5b: The higher the firm’s tax-paying status, the lower the firm’s discount rate. Conversely,
the lower the firm’s tax-paying status, the higher the firm’s discount rate.
4.6 Other Variables
Firm size and a year dummy variables are added to our models. Larger firms have more
employees, therefore, they have larger pension obligations. If firms can manage their plan
assets effectively, they can make use of economies of scale. However, as mentioned above,
most firms have unfunded pension status, and they don’t manage their plan assets effectively.
Therefore, larger firms will choose higher discount rates to reduce their large amount of
pension obligations.
5. Research Design
This empirical analysis is based on nine years of annual report data. The time period of
this study is from 2001, a year current accounting standard on employee benefits was
required, through the latest year, 2009, for which data are available. Firms that are treated in
this research design (excluding banks and insurance firms) are listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. Firms were selected that set and disclose both discount rates and expected return
rates on their financial statements. A sample of 10,444 firms for nine years is identified.
Financial data used in this study were collected from Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank
System (2009) which is provided by the Nikkei Digital Media, Inc..
To examine our hypotheses on the changes in discount rates, the following model is
employed:
△DRit = β0 + β1△PROFit + β2△LEVit + β3△FUNDit + β4△CASHit + β5△TAXit
              + β6SIZEit + ΣδDUMMYit
Variables are explained in Table 5.2 except for the dummy variable. DUMMY is a year
dummy. The correlation coefficients for the variables on changes in discount rates are shown
in Table 5.1. The result shows that there is a relationship between discount rates and all
variables.
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Table 5.2  Descriptive Statistics for the Changes in Discount Rates
Table 5.1  Correlation for the Changes in Discount Rates
Note : Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 5.2.
△DR= the ratio of change in discount rate on pension obligations as reported under Japanese account-
ing standard on employee benefits between period t-1 and period t.
△PROF= the ratio of change in (income before taxes + pension cost) / net assets between period t-1 and
period t.
△LEV= the ratio of change in (total liabilities – provision for retirement benefits) / net assets between
period t-1 and period t.
△FUND= the ratio of change in (pension obligations – unrecognized actuarial gain or loss) / plan assets
between period t-1 and period t.
△CASH= the ratio of change in (cash flows from operating activities – increase (decrease) in provision for
retirement benefits) / net assets between period t-1 and period t.
△TAX= the ratio of change in (income taxes + pension cost * effective tax rate (40%) – changes in
deferred taxes) / (cash flows from operating activities – increase (decrease) in provision for
retirement benefits) between period t-1 and period t.
SIZE= natural logarithm of sales.
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The result of the regression analysis on the changes in discount rate is in Table 5.3.  It
reveals that there is a positive relationship between discount rates and leverage, cash flows
from operating activities, and firm size, and a negative relationship between discount rates
and profitability and pension funding status. Only the effect of tax-paying status is
insignificant. However, the coefficient of pension funding status and cash flows from
operating activities should have opposite signs as explained in these hypotheses.
Table 5.4 shows the average ratios of changes in discount rates, pension funding status,
and cash flows from operating activities from 2001 to 2009. Compared with the average
yields of 30-year government bonds in Figure 2.2, the average ratios of discount rates from
2001 to 2003 are set higher than the average yields. From 2004 to 2009, the average ratios are
similar to the average yields. Japanese accounting standard states that an entity shall
determine the discount rate based on yields on safe and secure long bonds including
government bonds, government agency securities, and high-grade corporate bonds. Firms
follow the movement of yields of these bonds, including high-grade corporate bonds, which
are basically higher than yields of government bonds for the first three years. From 2004,
firms started to choose the rates similar to 20 or 30-year government bonds. They might have
some difficulties to choose their discount rates from 2001 to 2003, because the accounting
standard was quite different from the prior one. From 2004, firms might be able to find their
best estimate with consideration of an average discount rate of past several-year market
yields. Therefore, firms decreased their discount rates in conjunction with yields on safe and
secure long bonds from 2001 to 2003, and as a result, their pension funding status worsened.
The data for these first three years might lead to the negative coefficient on pension funding
Table 5.3  The Effect of Financial Ratios on the Changes in Discount Rates
Table 5.4  Average Ratios of Changes in Discount Rates, Pension Funding Status, and
Cash Flows from Operating Activities
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status in Table 5.3. After 2006, the average ratio of discount rates increases, whereas the
average yield of 30-year government bond decreases, and their funding status also increases.
This result indicates that firms might use discount rates to reduce their pension obligations.
With regard to cash flows from operating activities, the positive coefficient sign for it in
Table 5.3 should be affected by ratios for the first three years. The discount rates decrease
from 2001 to 2006. As explained above, firms might have some difficulties in setting
appropriate discount rates after the significant accounting change. Therefore, from 2001 to
2003, discount rates decrease, and the amount of cash flows from operating activities also
decreases. However, from 2006 to 2009, the average ratios in changes in cash flows from
operating activities decrease while discount rates increase. Therefore, after firms learn how
the new pension accounting standard works, firms might start to manipulate their earnings
through pension accounting.
Leverage has the most significant effect in Table 5.3. Pension liabilities have been already
on the balance sheet in the U.S., and will be in Japan. The accounting change reflects that
they are important liability factors on balance sheet even though they are off-balance. The
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) already noted that it would be conceptually
appropriate to recognize a net pension liability or asset measured as the difference between
PBO and plan assets when the accounting standard was issued in 1985. However, the
approach wasn’t adopted because it might be too great a change from past practice at the time
(SFAS87, par.107). Therefore, the effect of pension liabilities on leverage is significant, and
they affect the change in firms’ discount rates.
To examine our hypotheses on the levels in discount rates, the following model is
employed:
DRit = β0 + β1PROFit + β2LEVit + β3FUNDit + β4CASHit + β5TAXit + β6SIZEit
           + ΣδDUMMYit
The correlation coefficients for the variables on levels of discount rates are shown in Table
5.5. The result shows that there is a relationship between discount rates and profitability,
leverage, pension funding status, and firm size.
Table 5.7 shows that there are relationships between discount rates and all other variables
except tax-paying status, and they are the same result as in Table 5.3. Leverage and
profitability have an effect on levels of discount rates. This means that firms whose financial
conditions and operating results are not in good shape tend to choose high discount rates to
reduce their pension obligations and pension costs. Regarding with year dummy for both
changes and levels in discount rates, the t values from 2001 to 2004 were significant.
Therefore, the accounting change in 2001 might have some effects on firms’ discount rate
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Table 5.6  Descriptive Statistics for the Levels of Discount Rates
Table 5.5  Correlation for the Levels of Discount Rates
Note : Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 5.5.
DR= discount rate on pension obligations as reported under Japanese accounting standard on employee
benefits.
PROF= (income before taxes + pension cost) / net assets.
LEV= (total liabilities – provision for retirement benefits) / net assets.
FUND= (pension obligations – unrecognized actuarial gain or loss) / plan assets.
CASH= (cash flows from operating activities – increase (decrease) in provision for retirement benefits) /
net assets.
TAX= (income taxes + pension cost * effective tax rate (40%) – changes in deferred taxes) / (cash flows
from operating activities – increase (decrease) in provision for retirement benefits.
SIZE= natural logarithm of sales.
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changes and choices. These results prove that profitability, leverage, pension funding status,
and cash flows from operating activities influence the change and level of discount rates.
6. Summary and Conclusion
The current Japanese accounting standard on employee benefits was introduced in 2001.
The accounting change revealed that Japanese firms had considerable amounts of pension
deficits. Pension is defined as future payment of employees’ salary, and future prospects must
be considered to calculate pension obligations and pension costs. Several prior studies prove
that firms change the discount rates needed for predictions in their pursuit of earnings
management. Therefore, this study proved there is a relationship between changes or levels of
discount rates and other financial factors on financial statements.
The result indicates that profitability, leverage, pension funding status, and cash flows
from operating activities can be incentives to change and determine firms’ discount rates.
Until 2008, Japanese accounting standard required firms to determine their discount rates
with consideration of an average discount rate of past five-year market yields. Under this
condition, it seemed to be difficult for Japanese firms to change their discount rates for
earnings management; however, there was a tendency for firms to change their rates
depending on other financial factors. The result also showed that there was a relationship
between the levels of discount rates and some other financial factors including firms’ financial
condition and management results. Japanese accounting standard now requires firms to
review their discount rates annually, and moreover, pension liabilities will be on the balance
sheet from 2012. Therefore, there is a possibility that firms change or choose favorable rates
to decrease their pension obligations and pension costs, and reduce the negative effect of
these amounts on financial statements.
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